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Introduction 
The current highly challenging security environment triggers long-term unresolved problems. 
These mount considerable pressure on international actors and call for joint problem-solving 
since unilateral action or inaction is excluded given the scope of issues that emerged. 
International organisations (IOs) create and advance inter-organisational relations to address 
these challenges in a joint comprehensive manner (Biermann, 2008). Since the 11 September 
2001 attacks on the United States (US), terrorism has remained a key challenge for the 
international community. Due to different interpretations of Islam, which returned to Central 
Asia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and poor economic conditions, a rise in terrorist 
organisations and radicalisation has occurred in the majority of the Muslim Central Asian 
republics (Yazdani, 2009). Consequently, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), one of 
the most prominent terrorist organisations in the region was established in the late 1990s. 
Shortly after, this militant group forged ties with other terrorist organisations such as Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda (Ciment, 2007). With the rise of Islamic State (ISIS), the IMU officially pledged 
allegiance to ISIS in 2015 (Sharipzhan, 2015). Since then, approximately 2,000-4,000 Central 
Asians have joined ISIS as foreign fighters on battlefields in Syria (Crisis Group, 2015). 
Moreover, since 2016 several terrorist attacks were carried out by Central Asians in Turkey, 
Russia, Sweden, and the US. 
Given that all the Central Asian Republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan except for Turkmenistan are member states (mS) of both the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO), counter-terrorism in the region has shaped the agenda of both security organisations. 
With the same goal to promote peace, security and stability in their region, both organisations 
have repeatedly discussed “possible ways of strengthening relations with focus on activities … 
in Central Asia and their initiatives to counter terrorism” (OSCE Annual Report, 2007, p. 109). 
2 
 
The overlap in their function, geography, membership and financial sources supported by the 
exogenous pressures stemming from Central Asia and Afghanistan constitute preconditions for 
advanced cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO (Koops, 2017; Biermann, 2008; 
Peters, 2004). Despite established contacts and dialogue between the OSCE and the SCO, their 
inter-organisational cooperation (IOC) in counter-terrorism in Central Asia has proven to be 
irregular and weak (OSCE Annual Reports, 2004-2017).  
Therefore, this thesis will explore the research question “How can the weak cooperation 
between the OSCE and the SCO in counter-terrorism in Central Asia be explained?”. This thesis 
argues that the divergence in organisational cultures of the OSCE and the SCO represents the 
main obstacle preventing the two organisations from advancing cooperation in counter-
terrorism in Central Asia. The findings of this study expand current knowledge of the impact 
of the diverging organisational cultures and thus contribute to the research about the obstacles 
to IOC.  
By doing so, this study answers Biermann and Koops’ call (2017) to further investigate 
the impact of organisational culture which constitutes the academic relevance of this study. 
The research question is explored through the lenses of constructivism. This theory has not 
traditionally been used in the study of inter-organisational relations, where principal-agent 
theory has been more commonly employed. Therefore, this research aims to expand the 
constructivist perspective in this regard. The literature has largely focused on organisations with 
similar cultures, whereas this study examines the impact of divergences between organisational 
cultures, focusing on their values and delegation process. Furthermore, since research on the 
study of inter-organisational relations is a recent trend in International Relations, it thus requires 
“further testing across a wide range of cases” (Biermann, 2008). This research therefore 
expands the scope of case studies at dyadic level that currently focus on exploring the 
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cooperation between the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
or United Nations (UN) but lacks an analytical approach towards organisations in Asia.  
Given the transnational character of challenges arising in the international arena, it is 
important to address the internationally coordinated efforts not only within the respective IOs 
but among them as well. Therefore, the policy relevance of this research derives from the need 
to identify stumbling blocks that prevent organisations from cooperating effectively. Terrorism 
has become one of the most serious challenges for the current security structure, this research 
therefore aims to shed more light on the obstacles to effective coordination in this issue-area.  
This research conducts an in-depth analysis of organisational culture to identify its 
impact on cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO in counter-terrorism in Central Asia. 
The first section of this thesis reviews the current literature on this subject and outlines a 
theoretical framework which guides the analysis. The second section overviews the cooperation 
between the OSCE and the SCO in the studied issue-area from 2001 until the present. It expands 
on the empirical analysis by exploring the impact of the organisational culture in the form of 
values and delegations. The conclusion provides the limitations of this study, recommendations 
for further research and policy implications deriving from the findings.  
Literature Review 
Scholarly research on inter-organisational relations has engaged in factors which both facilitate 
and impede IOC. Drivers which motivate cooperation range from empowerment of 
organisations (Costa, 2017), preferences of mS (Koops, 2017) and staff members’ needs 
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003) to questions of trust (Brugger et al., 2017) or legitimation processes 
(Biermann, 2017). Biermann and Koops (2017, pp. 23-24) argue “many of the factors which 
inspire cooperation also inhibit cooperation when they are absent”. These two authors have 
specified the most substantial examples of the obstacles to IOC such as: 
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“lacking system level stimuli for cooperation, an insufficient openness to cooperate, no 
pressing resource needs, resistance of major mS, perceptions of illegitimacy, mismatch of 
organisational cultures and designs, personal discord or distrust and previous negative 
experience” (2017, pp. 23-24). 
However, given the current research has identified divergence of organisational cultures 
in inter-organisational relations as a factor which needs further exploration (Biermann and 
Koops, 2017), this research answers this call. Biermann (2008) briefly engages in the role of 
intra-organisational culture. He demonstrates that if the organisational culture differs within the 
particular departments of the organisation, it creates “communication failures and 
misunderstandings”. Consequently, this has a negative impact on the cooperation with other 
organisations. In contrast, this research aims to show that even if the organisational culture 
diffuses across the organisation as a whole, the divergence in cultures of organisations seeking 
to cooperate, creates an obstacle.  
Additionally, Gourlay (2000) argues that diverging organisational cultures constitute a 
problem particularly for the personnel of military and humanitarian organisations in peace 
operations. In these missions, the UN, NATO or national commands represent the military 
aspect, whereas the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental 
organisations the civilian aspect. By the differing nature of these actors, it can be assumed their 
different cultures can cause compatibility problems while cooperating. On the other hand, this 
research seeks to explore the divergence in seemingly similar organisations since both the 
OSCE and the SCO represent two regional security inter-governmental organisations.  
Härtel (2017) examines the impact of “hardly conductive organisational cultures” on 
relations between the Council of Europe and the civil society. He focuses on the “self-image of 
the organisation, characteristics of the Secretariat’s staff such as age and type of contracts, and 
the location of the organisation” as key indicators for organisational culture. In comparison, 
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this research explores the organisational culture through the lenses of values and delegation and 
thus aims to expand the perspective on how to approach the organisational culture as an 
obstacle.  
Moreover, the practice-oriented research has focused on the EU-NATO relations which 
pioneered the field and has become the illustrative case study for IOC (Biermann 2008; 
Smith, 2011; Koops, 2017). Although Gourlay (2009) has begun to address the EU-UN 
cooperation and its obstacles particularly in peacebuilding, the main focus has remained on the 
cooperation between the IOs founded in the West (Biermann and Koops, 2017). Thus there is 
a dearth of research on IOs founded beyond Europe and North America.  
Therefore, this thesis on cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO aims to draw 
conclusions applicable to cooperation between other organisations as well. Organisations that 
are guided by the Western liberal democracy model (EU, NATO, OSCE), and others by “Asian 
values” (Aris, 2009) (Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Commonwealth 
of States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), SCO). In doing so, it 
expands Møller’s (2007) findings about obstacles to cooperation between ASEAN and the EU 
which argues that there is a misunderstanding in organisations’ objectives without engaging 
into a detailed analysis of the organisational culture.  
Lastly, this study aims to explore the relations of the OSCE beyond the traditional 
research on its cooperation with the EU (Simao, 2012) and NATO (Peters, 2014). The only 
research on cooperation between the OSCE and SCO was conducted by De Haas (2007). 
De Haas (2007) provides an overview of the SCO development and cooperative efforts with 
the OSCE, which this study aims to expand since almost eleven years have passed since that. 
What´s more, as de Haas’ work focuses on all the potential aspects of cooperation, the issue of 
counter-terrorism is addressed only briefly. In contrast, this study has put counter-terrorism at 
the forefront of the analysis. Although De Haas argues that the OSCE and the SCO “differ a 
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great deal” due to opposing views on human rights issues, he is optimistic about their 
strengthened cooperation if “favourable trade-offs can be made” (De Haas, 2007, p. 257). 
Yet, this study shows that the relations between the OSCE and the SCO have not advanced 
since, and analyses why. 
 In this respect, the research finds it particularly helpful to focus on diverging 
organisational cultures while analysing cooperation in counter-terrorism. The lack of 
universally accepted definition of terrorism (Weinberg, Pedahzur, Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004) makes 
terrorism a politically loaded term whose meaning varies among international actors, both states 
and IOs. Therefore, organisational culture is the key factor that determines the overall approach 
towards counter-terrorism including the concepts, priorities and policies promoted by the 
organisations.  
Theoretical Framework 
This study focuses on the organisational culture as a key factor which hinders IOC between the 
OSCE and the SCO in counter-terrorism. Therefore, this research conducts an analysis at the 
level of analysis of the IOs, in other words unit level analysis (Biermann and Koops, 
2017, p. 18). Before proceeding into reasoning why this level of analysis has been identified as 
crucial by explaining the drawbacks of other levels of analysis which open a box of other 
potential obstacles to IOC, it is important to define the IOC itself.  
IOC can be viewed as interactions witnessed between IOs which is provoked by their 
growing links. Scholars argue that “actor proliferation”, “task expansion”, “issue density” 
characterised by a variety of challenges, “issue linkage” and “system shocks” have caused an 
overlap among IOs which led to IOC (Biermann and Koops, 2017, p. 13). According to 
Biermann (2008) “exogenous shocks” are one considerable cause for not only the outbreak of 
inter-organisational relations, but advanced IOC. This overlap is therefore perceived as the 
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“sine qua non” for IOC because it leads to “domain similarity”. That is characterised by 
functional and geographical overlap in the first place. An overlap in membership and resources 
embody other factors which foster IOC (Biermann and Koops, 2017, p. 17).  
As previously mentioned, the IOC and factors hindering it can be analysed at distinct 
levels of analysis: system, individual, member states and unit level (Biermann and Koops, 2017, 
p. 18). This study has selected the unit level, that is the level of organisations/bureaucracies for 
the following reasons. As the literature review shows the current research argues that system 
level obstacles to cooperation are in the form of “lack of system-level stimuli”. However, 
the 11 September attacks and security challenges coming from Central Asia as analysed in more 
detail in the next section present such “system shocks”. Therefore, there is no lack of such 
stimuli and this obstacle has not proved to be valid in this case.  
Moreover, this study does not emphasise the level of analysis of individuals which refers 
to contacts among “high-ranking boundary spanners” (Biermann and Koops, 2017, p. 18).  The 
long-term and regular positive rhetoric promoting cooperation and constant trend in this 
behaviour despite changes in SGs implies that obstacles such as “insufficient openness to 
cooperation” and “personal discord” do not play a fundamental role in hindering the 
cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO.  
This research does not completely contradict “the resistance of major mS” as an obstacle 
to cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO. Although the EU and the US differ from Russia 
in terms of where the focus on such cooperation should lie, the OSCE participating States (pS) 
do not express any kind of disapproval of cooperation with the SCO. On the contrary, they 
welcome the commitment of the OSCE to greater coordination (PC.DEL/690/13, 2013). 
Therefore, this research focuses on bureaucracies and so builds on Biermann (2017) who argues 
that this level of analysis is essential when IOs pursue actions separate from mS preferences.  
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To understand IOC on the level of bureaucracies, the current research on IOC recognises 
two theoretical perspectives - rationalist and constructivist. To start with rationalist, this account 
derives from the assumption that organisations follow “a utility-maximizing rationale” when 
promoting IOC (Biermann and Koops, 2017, p. 17). Therefore, it underlines resource 
dependence which according to Aiken and Hage (1968 cited in Biermann and Koops, 
2017, p. 17) increases “in periods of scarce or declining resources”. The research on cooperation 
between security organisations has identified that resource dependency refers to “needs of 
expertise, resources and legitimacy-providing support” (Biermann and Koops, 2017, p. 17). 
Applying this logic to obstacles to IOC, the rationalist account highlights that if IOs have “no 
pressing resource needs”, their cooperation is less likely. However, the OSCE budget has been 
declining in recent years (PC.DEC/1288, 2018; PC.DEC/1252, 2017; PC.DEC/1197, 2015) and 
the overall budget of the SCO causes shortcomings in implementation of the SCO activities, 
according to the European Parliament (2015). Such a situation should hence promote 
coordinated cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO, which has not occurred. Therefore, 
the obstacle of “no pressing resource needs” is dismissed as a factor behind weak cooperation 
between the OSCE and the SCO.  
 The obstacle in the form of “perceptions of illegitimacy” is a more contested factor 
from a theoretical perspective. Although a rationalist account views legitimacy as a resource, 
the sources of legitimacy are set in the procedural aspects of decisions (Rittberger and 
Schroeder, 2016) and “the conformity to established international agreements and shared 
norms” (Reinalda, 2007, p. 49), which aligns with constructivism. Therefore, this research does 
not view “perceptions of illegitimacy” as a primary obstacle to cooperation between the OSCE and 
the SCO but as an outcome of different values embedded in the organisational culture.   
In contrast to rationalist account, constructivism helps to explain the weak cooperation 
between the OSCE and the SCO in counter-terrorism in Central Asia by analysing the 
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divergence of their organisational cultures focusing on values and delegation processes. 
Therefore, constructivism is used as a theoretical framework for the analysis. Its added value 
lies in its approach towards IOs. This is based on the notion that bureaucracies are actors that 
“pursue their own agendas based on a shared bureaucratic culture which shapes the staff’s view 
of the world and guides action” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004 cited in Biermann, 2017, p. 253).  
Although the concept of organisational culture is ambiguous, this study refers to 
organisational culture as “the climate and practices that organisations develop around their 
handling of people, or to the promoted values and statement of beliefs of an organisation”. The 
organisational culture thus serves as a cornerstone for the identity of the organisation and 
“determines … the way in which things are done around here” (O’Donnell and Boyle, 
2008, p. 2). Consequently, this research identifies values and delegation processes as key for 
organisational culture.  
Following the constructivist account, “patterns of shared beliefs and values” embedded 
in the organisational culture guide the organisational behaviour and thus facilitate the 
understanding of the IOC and its obstacles (Davis, 1984, cited in Martin, 2002, p. 57; 
Biermann, 2017). However, since the world is socially constructed, the behaviour of actors, and 
hence bureaucracies, in world politics is conditioned by their own interpretation and 
understanding of the world (Hurd, 2008). Consequently, this can lead to a situation where 
actors’ understanding of seemingly the same values “can and often do presuppose incompatible 
ways of seeing and experiencing the world” (Roach, 2016, p. 402). In this regard, this research 
builds on Abott and Snidal’s (2002), and Schwartz’s (2012, p. 4) understanding of values as 
“standards or criteria” which “guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and 
events” and hence have impact on the IOC in the form of organisational culture.  
On the other hand, the way bureaucracies are granted delegated authority considerably 
influences their organisational culture as well. Delegation in this research is defined as “a 
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conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on 
behalf of the former” (Hawkins et al., 2006 cited in Lenz and Marks, 2015, p. 514). In other 
words, bureaucracies are entrusted by the mS with certain tasks which are coordinated under a 
hierarchical command (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 18-19). This implies that bureaucracies 
have a hierarchical organisational culture with a defined mandate. However, constructivist 
scholars (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 22) argue that delegation is a complex process in 
which the mandates are “often vague, broad, or conflicting” which leaves space for an 
autonomous interpretation by the bureaucracy. This leads to a situation that “at some level 
delegation creates autonomy” and therefore “delegation rarely results in unproblematic service 
of state interests”. Consequently, the extent to which delegation serves to the fulfilment of needs 
of the mS differs and so the autonomy which bureaucracies enjoy within the hierarchical 
organisational culture. This matters for the IOC because a different degree of delegation and 
hence autonomy makes it more complicated for organisations to cooperate since the specific 
aspects of cooperation are discussed at distinct levels. This can lead to ineffectiveness in the 
coordination of policies and decision-making in common projects, which results in limits for 
cooperation.  
The question of delegation is typically accompanied by pooling defined as “joint 
decision making among the principals themselves” (Hooghe and Marks, 2014, p. 3). However, 
since both the OSCE and the SCO’s decision-making process is based on a consensus rule, the 
degree of pooling is characterised by the same nominal value as showed in Hooghe and Marks 
(2014, p. 6). Therefore, this research does not perceive pooling as an obstacle in the cooperation 
between the OSCE and the SCO as there is no difference between the two organisations in this 
regard. 
As this research views values as the cornerstone of organisational culture and the 
delegation as its outer aspect, this study expects the divergence in organisational culture to limit 
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the cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO in counter-terrorism in Central Asia to weak 
cooperation. This expectation builds on Martin (2001, cited in Lipson, 2017, p. 72) who 
assumes that “organisations with similar types of organisational culture cooperate more easily 
or efficiently, while organisations with different types of cultures may find it difficult to 
cooperate”.  
Research Design  
Research design and data collection 
This research uses a method of qualitative case study design focusing on the impact of 
organisational culture on the cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO in counter-terrorism 
in Central Asia. It expands the knowledge about this variable in the research on the obstacles 
to IOC and aims to contribute to theory-building in this respect. The OSCE and the SCO were 
selected based on a literature review of the inter-organisational relations and the cases studied. 
Consequently, a lack of research on the OSCE’s inter-organisational relations as well as 
regional organisations in Asia was identified, which led to shift the focus on these organisations. 
Moreover, as discussed in the literature review previous research has put a special emphasis on 
cooperation between the organisations founded in the West. Therefore, this research serves as 
an illustrative case study for obstacles behind cooperation between organisations guided by the 
Western liberal democracy model on the one hand, and organisations with the “Asian values” 
on the other hand (Aris, 2009). The findings of this case study do not strive to be applicable to 
universal organisations such as the UN, World Bank and others. However, they focus on 
application to the cooperation of mainly regional organisations which address security issues 
such the EU, OSCE, NATO in the West and ASEAN, SCO, CIS and CSTO in Asia.  
This case study is investigated using a discourse analysis, analysing the contextual 
meaning of organisational cultures of the OSCE and the SCO. The OSCE Annual Reports 
together with the SCO News and the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (SCO RATS) 
12 
 
News from 2001 to 2018 published on the SCO official websites has served to identify the level 
of cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO. The sources for the data collection for the 
analysis of organisational culture as an obstacle to cooperation include organisations’ founding 
documents, strategies, decisions, declarations, communiques, reports, mandates, statements 
given by high officials and secretariat personnel. Press releases of the activities of the OSCE 
Field Operations in Central Asia except for the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, as Turkmenistan is 
not a mS of both organisations, and activities of the SCO in Central Asia from 2001 to 2018 
present other sources of information. This enabled an assessment of what counter-terrorism 
activities are characteristic for both organisations and how the counter-terrorism policies reflect 
organisational cultures of the OSCE and the SCO. The year 2001 was selected as a starting 
point for the analysis since it represents the year when the SCO was established.  
Operationalisation  
IOC represents the dependent variable in this research. It can be viewed as weak or strong based 
on the density of ties developed between the IOs. Weak cooperation presents the most basic 
form of relations which prevents IOs from developing effective channels of cooperation. The 
indicator for weak IOC is information sharing that is characterised by 1) granting observer 
status to one another, 2) invitations to attend or address meetings and 3) the establishment of 
liaison mechanisms. On the other hand, strong IOC embodies the will of both IOs to promote 
complementarity and to compromise in order to adapt their policies to the preferences of the 
other. The indicators for such cooperation are 1) coordination of policies and 2) joint decision-
making in projects which requires task division and shared responsibility (Biermann, 
2008, pp. 165-166). 
The independent variable embodies diverging organisational culture, whose indicators 
are values and delegation. Beginning with values, as this research focuses on the OSCE as an 
organisation based on the Western liberal democracy model and the SCO as an organisation 
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guided by the Asian values which puts emphasis on sovereignty (Aris, 2009), the high or low 
frequency of the presence of the values of 1) democracy and 2) sovereignty in the documents 
of these organisations has been identified as a key measure. As values guide the policies of an 
organisation, policies in counter-terrorism based on the value of democracy are guided by the 
elements of democracy, which are 1) rule of law, 2) protection of human rights, 3) tolerance 
and non-discrimination, and 4) participation of civil society. The same logic is applied to the 
value of sovereignty and its impact on counter-terrorism policies. The indicators for sovereignty 
are 1) territorial integrity, 2) sovereign equality of states and 3) non-intervention based on 
Jackson’s (1999) understanding of sovereignty.  
The second indicator for organisational culture is delegation, which as discussed in the 
theoretical framework allows for autonomy. Therefore, this research measures delegation as 
“[the extent to which individual mS transfer competencies to non-state bodies]” 
(Lenz and Marks, 2015, p. 529). The different degree of transfer of competencies within the 
OSCE and the SCO is assessed in 1) decision-making bodies, 2) executive structures 
and 3) in the field.  
The development of cooperation between the OSCE and SCO in counter-
terrorism in Central Asia 
The inter-organisational relations between the OSCE and SCO are shaped by the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks on the US, which influenced overall global counter-terrorism strategy. 
This system-level factor which occurred only three months after the official establishment of 
the SCO, was a stimulus for the OSCE to initiate IOC. As countering terrorism has become a 
top priority, the OSCE decided to undertake concrete steps to promote joint-response. 
The ‘Decision on Combating Terrorism’ and ‘Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating 
Terrorism’, adopted at the OSCE Ministerial Council in 2001, expressed the commitment to 
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“broaden the dialogue with the partners outside the OSCE area … and to exchange best 
practices and lessons learned in counter-terrorism …” (MC (9). DEC/1, 2001). The SCO was 
one of the organisations with which the OSCE intended to do so.  
The first official contact between the Secretary General of the OSCE (OSCE SG), Jan 
Kubis, and the SCO Executive Secretary General (SCO SG), Zhan Deguang, took place at the 
inauguration of the SCO Secretariat in 2004 in Beijing. Both executive leaders discussed 
“possible areas for cooperation” which pointed at the counter-terrorism in Central Asia (OSCE 
Annual Report, 2005, p. 144). The following interaction between the OSCE and the SCO 
appeared to be a promising step towards developing stronger cooperation in the region. 
To give an illustration, during the same year the OSCE was invited to the opening ceremony of 
the Executive Committee of the SCO RATS. The SCO participated in OSCE/ODIHR 
Roundtable on Combating Extremism in Central Asia and Regional Travel Documents Security 
Workshop (OSCE Annual Report, 2005, p. 144; OSCE, 2004). Moreover, both organisations 
together with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime organised a Regional Workshop 
on Implementation of Universal Anti-terrorism Instruments in 2005 (OSCE Annual Report, 
2006, p. 137).  
The initial intention to develop ties between the OSCE and the SCO was brought about 
the shock caused by Al-Qaeda attacks on the US (MC (9). DEC/1, 2001). Notwithstanding, the 
will to cooperate is to be found in the security challenges Central Asia has been exposed to 
since the 1990s due to the proximity to Afghanistan – the then hub for terrorist activities of the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Both the OSCE and the SCO have been confronted with the phenomena 
of violent separatism, extremism and radicalisation targeting the Central Asian society and 
terrorist activities of IMU (Istanbul Document 1999, 1999, p. 48; Action Programme, 2001).  
Such highly challenging environment supported the onset of inter-organisational 
relations between the OSCE and the SCO which had the potential to be strengthened based on 
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the domain similarity of both organisations. The functional and geographical overlap played a 
significant role in finding the issue-area of cooperation given both the OSCE and the SCO’s 
goal is to enhance regional security and stability with a strategic focus on counter-terrorism 
activities in Central Asia (Istanbul Document 1999, 1999; Joint Communique, 2002). 
Furthermore, the overlapping membership of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and Russia constituted an incentive to foster cooperation. Last, but not least, the overlap in 
sources of financial contributions to both organisations could have opened the door to an 
efficient cooperation since the overlap as a condition for IOC has been fulfilled in all four 
dimensions in the case of the OSCE and the SCO.  
Since 2006, high-level officials from the OSCE Secretariat and the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly, and the SCO Secretariat have been highlighting the intention to expand and 
strengthen their cooperation in counter-terrorism in Central Asia (OSCE Annual Report, 
2017, p. 100; OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 2017) and so have showed the openness to 
cooperation. Moreover, this positive rhetoric has been expressed by all the SGs, which implies 
that personal discord does not play such a role in the OSCE-SCO relations. Despite all this, 
their cooperation has proved to be weak. The dialogue between the OSCE Transnational Threat 
Department (OSCE TNT), the OSCE Field Operations on the one hand, and the SCO RATS 
and the SCO Secretariat on the other hand, has been established, however not institutionalised. 
This is supported by the fact there are no negotiations about a potential Memorandum of 
Understanding addressing areas of common interest under consideration (SCO External 
Communication, 2018). In contrast to the rhetoric of both organisations, the cooperation 
between the OSCE and the SCO has been limited to information sharing.  
This level of IOC has taken place in the form of irregular observer status at the OSCE 
Ministerial Councils granted to the SCO and the SCO invitation for the OSCE to observe the 
SCO anti-terrorist exercise “Kazyrgut-Antiterror 2013” (SCO, 2013). No permanent liaison 
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mechanism has been established between the OSCE and the SCO. Information sharing takes 
places in the form of meetings and delivering reports. The OSCE invited the SCO SG to deliver 
reports about the SCO activities to the OSCE Permanent Council in 2007 and 2013 
(OSCE Annual Report, 2008; OSCE Annual Report, 2014). In 2017, the SCO SG and Executive 
Committee Director of the SCO RATS addressed the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation 
(Alimov, 2017a). Finally, the OSCE, especially the OSCE Field Operations in Central Asia 
have been inviting the SCO to participate in events such as workshops and conferences in order 
to exchange views on topics related to counter-terrorism in the region.  
Meetings at the executive level and non-coordinated activities at the operational level 
have been characteristic for the degree of cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO. Not 
even the IMU’s pledge of allegiance to ISIS in 2015 (Sharipzhan, 2015), which can be perceived 
as another exogenous shock for the region, led to a coordination of policies in Central Asia. 
Although, the OSCE SG, Thomas Greminger stated in 2017 that he believes the cooperation 
with the SCO can be strengthened “in light of the common challenges and threats…” and 
“the two organisations can pool their efforts in the fight against international terrorism, 
extremism ….” (SCO, 2017). This statement followed the trend of reiterating the intention to 
enhance their cooperation which has not advanced after years after their first call for 
cooperation. The cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO has thus not reached its potential 
given the domain similarity and the promising steps undertaken at the beginning of their inter-
organisational relations. Having laid out the character of the cooperation between the OSCE 
and the SCO, the following section engages in the analysis of organisational culture as an 
obstacle to stronger cooperation.   
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The role of diverging organisational culture in the cooperation between the 
OSCE and the SCO 
Democracy – cornerstone of the OSCE’s organisational culture 
The organisational culture of the OSCE derives from three main documents adopted during the 
OSCE Summits, namely the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 
(1990) and the Istanbul Document 1999 (1999). The principles embedded in these documents 
create a clear pattern which emphasises the value of democracy as a building block of the OSCE 
and hence guides its approach towards counter-terrorism. The Istanbul Document 1999 
(1999, p. 48) specifically states that “strengthening the rule of law, the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as well as the development of civil societies constitute one of the 
centrepieces in our broad framework…”. Hence it follows that the principle of democracy and 
its elements, such as rule of law, protection of human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, 
and participation of civil society are key for OSCE Ministerial Decisions on counter-terrorism 
related activities and guide the work of the OSCE Secretariat and the OSCE Field Operations 
in this regard.  
It is important to recall that the OSCE addresses the value of sovereignty as well. 
The OSCE promotes relations based on mutual respect for sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and non-intervention, be it “direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal 
or external affairs within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State” 
(Helsinki Final Act, 1975, p. 6). However, a special emphasis on sovereignty is not reiterated 
in the OSCE documents or mandates of the OSCE Field Operations in Central Asia. On the 
other hand, the OSCE strategies and guidelines which address the counter-terrorism efforts 
undertaken by the OSCE do so with democracy. Therefore, its frequency is considerably higher 
than the presence of the value of sovereignty.  
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To give some specific examples, the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and 
Stability in the Twenty-First Century (OSCE Strategy, 2003, p. 1-2) denominated terrorism as 
one of the most serious sources of instability which “seeks to undermine the very values that 
unite the participating States in the OSCE area”. At the same time, this document clearly stated 
that “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law is at 
the core of the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security”. This together with “fostering 
tolerance and non-discrimination” as declared in the Ministerial Declaration on Reinforcing 
OSCE Efforts to Counter Terrorism in the Wake of Recent Terrorist Attacks 
(MC.DOC/3/15, 2015), are explicit demonstrations of the importance of democracy in the 
OSCE organisational culture.  
Since values in the organisational culture guide action and the OSCE’s staff, promoting 
democracy is the basic principle on which counter-terrorism activities are based. The Action 
against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE TNT and other related OSCE bodies such as Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) contribute to fulfil the mandate in this 
regard through the OSCE Field Operations in Central Asia. Their activities range from 
combating money laundering and terrorism financing to building law enforcement capacity in 
the fight against terrorism where the OSCE puts an effort on enhancing the rule of law. On the 
other hand, the emphasis on human rights, tolerance and engagement of civil society leads the 
activities regarding the strengthening of travel document security, and activities focusing on 
countering violent extremism and radicalisation that leads to terrorism (VERLT) (Astana, 2018; 
Bishkek, 2018; Dushanbe 2018; Uzbekistan, 2018).  
Consequently, the OSCE personnel’s rhetoric reflects these values constantly as seen in 
the speeches given at the OSCE activities in the region. To highlight a few and to see the 
continuity, in 2012 the Head of the OSCE Centre in Astana, Natalia Zarudna, declared that 
“upholding to human rights is not only compatible with anti-terrorism activities, it is an 
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indivisible part of the struggle against terrorism” (OSCE, 2012). In the same vein only five 
years before, in 2007, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Markus Muller, argued that 
“fighting terrorism cannot be an area in which the principles of rule of law and the respect of 
human rights exceptionally become invalid” (OSCE, 2007). The engagement of civil society 
organisations and their cooperation in counter-terrorism with the state authorities was 
highlighted by the Deputy Head of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek (OSCE, 2009a). 
Lastly, ODIHR’s Adviser on Anti-Terrorism Issues made a clear point during a high-level 
meeting in Tajikistan in 2009. She expressed an opinion that “while pursuing the legitimate 
goal of combating terrorism, states are also responsible for protecting the very values that 
terrorism attempts to undermine” (OSCE, 2009b). By this, she undoubtedly made a reference 
to the value of democracy, the core of the OSCE organisational culture given that democracy 
is that principle threatened by terrorism as stated in the OSCE documents for example the 
previously mentioned ‘OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 
Twenty-First Century’ (OSCE Strategy, 2003).  
Sovereignty – guiding principle for the SCO organisational culture 
As this research expects the divergence in organisational cultures to limit the cooperation 
between the OSCE and the SCO, it is necessary to address the value on which the organisational 
culture of the SCO is grounded. In contrast to the OSCE core value, the Charter of the SCO, 
which defines the founding principles of the organisation, strongly refers to the value of 
sovereignty. The Charter specifies “mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial 
integrity, inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs …, 
and equality of all member States …” (SCO Charter, 2002, p. 3). Any reference to democracy 
and its supportive values is notably missing. Meanwhile, all the Declarations of Council of 
Heads of States of the SCO which among other address counter-terrorism always highlight the 
value of sovereignty. 
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The instances in which democracy is mentioned in the SCO documents appears in the 
context of “multipolar system of international relations” (SCO Declaration, 2002). The SCO 
promotes the world order in the 21st century to be based on “the mechanisms of collective 
resolution of key issues, rule of law and consistent democratization of international relations” 
(SCO Declaration, 2002). Despite the SCO’s reaffirmation to respect human rights, at the same 
time it opposed “interference in the internal affairs of other countries under the pretext of their 
protection” (SCO Declaration, 2002, p. 2), again appealing to the principle of sovereignty. 
The only document which declares that counter-terrorism measures should be undertaken based 
on democratic values is the Convention of the SCO against Terrorism (SCO, 2009). 
Having said this, it is seen that the frequency of sovereignty as a guiding value of the SCO 
outweighs the principle of democracy.  
The SCO Secretariat and the SCO RATS are the executive bodies which are in charge 
of facilitating the SCO activities and thus go in line with sovereignty as a foundation of the 
SCO organisational culture. The first focus area of the SCO counter-terrorism measures lies in 
the coordination between law enforcement agencies of the SCO mS, and combating money 
laundering and financing terrorism. The SCO work is in this regard shaped by “[the respect for 
national sovereignty … and in accordance with national legislation of the SCO member states]” 
(SCO Development Strategy, 2015, p. 5). Joint border, and “Peace Mission” military counter-
terrorist exercises, and training manoeuvres such as “Kazyrgut-Antiterror 2013” or “Central 
Asia-Antiterror 2015” constitute a second significant field of cooperation between the SCO mS. 
These operations seek to develop and strengthen mechanisms in counter-terrorism cooperation 
and to identify foreign fighters coming back to their countries of origin (SCO RATS, 2016). 
Importantly, they are carried out “while respecting the principle of inviolability of borders” in 
order not to restrain national sovereignty of SCO mS on which territory the exercise takes place 
(SCO Development Strategy, 2015, p. 7). 
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In addition, in 2015 the SCO expressed a commitment to engage civil society to counter 
radicalisation which leads to extremism and terrorism (SCO Development Strategy, 2015). 
Such decision constitutes a new trend given the fact the SCO has placed limited emphasis on 
the civil society, which differs considerably from the OSCE policies. One of the concrete step 
was the opening of SCO-China Centre for Youth Exchange in December 2017 
(Alimov, 2017b). However, it remains unclear to what extent and how this institution will 
engage in combating the phenomena of extremism and terrorism as it resembles more a cultural 
project. That said, we can clearly see how the value of sovereignty guides the SCO activities 
and relations between the SCO mS.  
“Vague, Broad and Conflicting Mandate” – a way for OSCE autonomy within the 
organisational culture? 
Before engaging with the delegation process which influences the OSCE’s organisational 
culture, it is important to bear in mind that the OSCE is an intergovernmental organisation 
where the decisions are adopted by consensus of 57 pS on a politically, but not legally binding 
basis (OSCE Structure, 2018). This implies that the pS have a significant say in the decision-
making bodies. However, what we need to pay a special attention to is the possibility to interpret 
the mandate in an autonomous way. 
To start with the decision-making bodies, there are several bodies where the OSCE pS 
are represented and task the OSCE executive structure and the OSCE Field Operations, which 
provides the organisation with delegated authority. However, it is important to note that 
Summits or meetings at the highest political level of Heads of States or Governments are 
exceptional and irregular. They have a more symbolic meaning as they provide the overall 
direction to the organisation (OSCE Structure, 2018).  
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Therefore, the delegation in practical matters occurs based on the decisions of the 
Ministerial Council which is “the central decision-making and governing body” and addresses 
specific issues such as counter-terrorism. These decisions therefore provide the organisation 
with mandate to act accordingly. Since the pS seek to enable an effective response to the 
operational needs of the OSCE, the Permanent Council consisting of national diplomats meets 
weekly (OSCE Structure, 2018). Nevertheless, the decisions adopted by this body concern 
extension of mandate and allocation of budget to the OSCE Field Operations (Permanent 
Council, 2018). Consequently, on the one hand, it is necessary to attribute an influential role of 
the OSCE pS in the formation of the specific mandate and resources. On the other hand, there 
is no need to get approval for concrete activities that fulfil the mandate on the operational level, 
which grants the OSCE culture a certain autonomy.  
Another aspect of the delegation process is that the OSCE disposes by a complex 
executive structure, in which several departments and the OSCE institutions engage in counter-
terrorism. In this regard, it is key to point out that the SG is guided by the priorities of the 
annually rotating Chairmanship in hands of one pS (OSCE Structure, 2018). This takes us back 
to the influence of pS. Nevertheless, it is essential to remember that the OSCE Secretariat is 
guided by the OSCE values, and interpret the mandate accordingly.  
In other words, all the pS are formally committed to “full respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and ... 
as well as promote tolerance throughout society” (Helsinki Document, 1992). This provides the 
bodies of the OSCE executive structure (SG, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 
the OSCE TNT), three autonomous OSCE institutions (ODIHR, the OSCE Representative on 
Freedom of Media and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities) and the OSCE 
Field Operations with a leverage in fulfilling the delegated mandate (OSCE Structure, 2018).  
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Since the OSCE counter-terrorism measures highlight the need for respecting human 
rights, the transfer of competencies in this respect derives from the Moscow Mechanism 
adopted in 1991 which declares that “commitments undertaken in the field of the human rights 
dimension of the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all pS and do not belong 
exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned” (Moscow Document, 1991, p. 29).  
From the above mentioned quote, it is clear that delegation is a complex process within 
the OSCE which takes place at several levels. Therefore, a coordination of the mandate and its 
interpretation across the OSCE bodies dealing with the counter-terrorism related activities is 
needed. Nevertheless, since the interpretation of the mandate is based on the OSCE values, 
which emphasise the leading role of democracy, the autonomy allowed by the delegation 
promotes behaviour in the same vein.  
 The last aspect which needs to be addressed is the limits which the OSCE Field 
Operations (Programme Office in Astana, Bishkek, Dushanbe and OSCE Project Co-ordinator 
in Uzbekistan) face while being delegated tasks based on a specific mandate, which are in 
accordance with the priorities of the host country. From the interpretative statements by the 
Central Asian countries, it is obvious that the OSCE Field Operations host countries aim to 
make the mandates very specific to avoid a different interpretation by the OSCE Field 
Operations than desired by the national authorities (PC.DEC/1153, 2014; PC.DEC/1250, 2017; 
PC.DEC/1251, 2017). Despite these attempts, the mandates remain conflicting and provides the 
OSCE with a manoeuvre space and certain degree of autonomy. 
The SCO autonomy within the organisational culture as an undesirable component? 
In the case of the SCO, a delegation process takes places only at two levels since the SCO is 
composed by the decision-making bodies and the SCO executive structure 
(SCO Charter, 2002). Given the current prevailing character of the SCO current counter-
terrorism measures, the activities in the field such as joint border and military anti-terrorism 
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exercises are carried out by the competent authorities of the mS themselves (SCO RATS, 2016). 
Consequently, this implies that the degree of autonomy at the operational level is left in the 
hands of the mS which act with the assistance of the SCO bodies. 
The delegation process in the SCO is significantly limited by the regular engagement of 
decision-making bodies of the organisation into the SCO activities. A straightforward evidence 
is the activity of the supreme SCO body - Council of Heads of State. That, in contrast to the 
OSCE Summits holds regular meetings once a year and its declarations are guiding not only for 
the SCO direction but the specific activities as well (SCO Charter, 2002, pp. 5-6). The direct 
power of the highest political representatives of the SCO mS, implies a significant role of 
sovereignty in the organisational culture, which limits potential autonomy.   
Another evidence of high-authority in the hands of mS that impedes the delegation is 
the fact that the SCO budget is approved by the Council of Heads of Government. This shows 
a two-level higher authority than in the case of the OSCE where the Permanent Council is 
responsible for these decisions. Another striking fact which restricts the delegation within the 
SCO is the fact that Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs can make statements on behalf of 
the SCO, which shows the degree of authority the representatives of the national government 
have in the SCO (SCO Charter, 2002, p. 5). Since the mS have such a high degree of authority, 
the delegated authority which creates autonomy for the SCO culture decreases. Above all, the 
delegation to the executive structure is limited by the Meetings of Heads of Ministries 
who discuss particular issues of cooperation and are granted the possibility to “establish 
standing or ad hoc expert working groups of experts carrying out their activities” 
(SCO Charter, 2002, p. 6).  
Interestingly, the SCO disposes of the Council of National Coordinators, which 
coordinates and direct daily activities of the organisation. Such a body might be comparable to 
the OSCE Chairmanship. However, in this case, it is pertinent to remember that this Council is 
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composed of coordinators appointed by each mS (SCO Charter, 2002, p. 6). That emphasises 
the role of sovereign equality of states in the SCO.  
From the above mentioned, it seems that the delegation to the SCO Secretariat is 
significantly restricted, which is supported by the role of the Council of National Coordinators. 
Moreover, the value of sovereignty permeates the SCO Secretariat significantly. The SCO 
Secretariat staff is appointed on a basis of quota which ensures a completely equal 
representation of all mS. This factor coupled with the rule that the SCO SG has deputies from 
all the other mS, allows the mS to have control in the executive branch (SCO Charter, 
2002, p. 7). The second SCO executive body is the SCO RATS, which “assists in the 
coordination and collaboration of Parties’ competent agencies in combating terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism…” (SCO RATS, 2002, p. 2). Such task in the form of coordination 
and collaboration apparently restricts the delegated authority of the body. To summarise, the 
degree of delegation which allows for autonomy within the organisation is highly limited.  
Divergence in organisational cultures as a limit to cooperation between the OSCE 
and the SCO in counter-terrorism in Central Asia 
All things considered, it is reasonable to argue that the organisational culture of the OSCE and 
the SCO diverges considerably since the frequency and emphasis on the values of sovereignty 
and democracy differ in the OSCE and the SCO approach towards counter-terrorism in Central 
Asia. Moreover, the divergence in the delegation process differs as well because the OSCE 
allows more autonomy within its organisational culture in comparison to the SCO’s hierarchical 
command.  
While the OSCE puts a special emphasis on the value of democracy, which guides its 
counter-terrorism activities, the SCO highlights sovereignty as a guiding principle. These two 
approaches, therefore, clash when it comes to the question of IOC between the OSCE and the 
SCO. This prevents organisations from developing stronger cooperation which would require 
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coordination of policies and joint decision-making in common projects given the role of 
diverging values as a guide in organisational behaviour.  
Consequently, the methods based on which both organisations aim to counter terrorism 
differ a great deal. The overall OSCE counter-terrorism strategy is based on promotion of 
democracy, human rights and rule of law. However, this would be perceived as an interference 
into the internal affairs of a state by the SCO, which opposes its basic values. Moreover, 
meanwhile civil society is a key actor for the OSCE in counter-terrorism, the SCO has not 
developed any concrete mechanisms in this regard, which would lead to friction in their 
cooperation. This explains why the SCO participates in the OSCE activities which cover topics 
such as foreign terrorist fighters and border issues but not in those engaging in prevention of 
VERLT. In other words, the first set of activities have more technical character. It does not 
promote human rights and participation of civil society as a “indivisible part” of the OSCE 
counter-terrorism efforts to such an extent as the OSCE activities focusing on prevention of 
VERLT (Dushanbe, 2018; Uzbekistan, 2018).  
Furthermore, according to the OSCE, “… cooperation with the other organisations and 
institutions currently encompasses political dialogue, coordination, and structured cooperation 
on thematic and regional issues across the OSCE region, based on common values and 
objectives” (OSCE Strategy, 2003). At the same time, the SCO declares that it has established 
partnerships with international organisations “that share the SCO principles and values (SCO 
Development Strategy, 2015). This explains why the OSCE and the SCO have not 
institutionalised their cooperation. Based on the divergence in their founding values, we cannot 
expect the organisations to engage in stronger form of cooperation.  
Another aspect of organisational culture of the OSCE and the SCO which impedes their 
cooperation is the diverging level of delegation within these organisations. Although, both 
organisations are driven by consensus-decision making mechanisms, the involvement of mS in 
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the implementation of counter-terrorism policies differs. Meanwhile, the OSCE pS formulate 
the mandates of the OSCE in this regard, the implementation of counter-terrorism policies is 
done through several OSCE executive bodies and the OSCE Field Operations. This implies that 
delegation within the OSCE culture is a complex process that allows the OSCE to interpret its 
mandate and thus results in greater autonomy in comparison to the SCO. The SCO counter-
terrorism policies are under a direct control of the SCO mS given the considerable role of 
national governments in the SCO executive bodies through the Meetings of Heads of Ministries 
and the Council of National Coordinators. Moreover, the fact the SCO RATS serves only as a 
coordination body in activities of the SCO mS implies lower delegation. All this not only limits 
the delegation in the SCO but also restricts the possibility to interpret the mandate 
autonomously. Having said this, it could be argued that delegation within the SCO does not 
“result in unproblematic service of state interests”. In contrast to the OSCE, which seeks to find 
ways to change the delegated authority into autonomy by acting in accordance with its 
autonomous interpretation of the mandate.  
Linking this to the IOC, the different degree of delegation and hence autonomy, limits 
cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO since decisions regarding the specific counter-
terrorism activities are discussed and consequently occur with different degree of involvement 
of the mS. Therefore, this makes it difficult for the OSCE and the SCO to promote stronger 
cooperation. Stronger cooperation would require coordination of policies and even joint 
decision-making in common activities. For this, an engagement in dialogue across different 
levels of the OSCE and the SCO bodies would be necessary. Hence it follows that both aspects 
of organisational cultures hinder cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO and so prevent 
them from advancing their cooperation in counter-terrorism in Central Asia.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has identified diverging organisational culture as a key obstacle to cooperation 
between the OSCE and the SCO in counter-terrorism in Central Asia and analysed its impact. 
Given that the OSCE and the SCO attribute diverging importance to the value of democracy 
and sovereignty, and the delegation processes allows for different degrees of autonomy within 
the organisational culture, the cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO remains weak. 
This prevents organisations from establishing stronger cooperation in the form of coordination 
of policies and joint projects decision-making. This research thus contributes to expand the 
theory about obstacles to efficient IOC by studying a case of cooperation between organisations 
founded in the West and in Asia. By doing so, it creates an illustrative example which can be 
further tested on other dyadic cases such as the cooperation between the EU, NATO or the 
OSCE on the one hand, and ASEAN, CIS, CSTO and SCO on the other hand.  
Regarding the policy implication of this study, the OSCE and the SCO should identify 
counter-terrorism activities where there is a minimum clash in their organisational values and 
focus their cooperation in this direction. Attempts by the OSCE to strengthen cooperation in 
activities focusing on promoting democratic institutions, human rights and rule of law could be 
perceived as violation of the basic SCO principles of sovereignty and could have an inverse 
effect than deepening the IOC. Both organisations should therefore enhance established 
cooperation in more technical fields such as identification of foreign fighters and ensuring 
security of borders, and newly engage in preventing terrorist recruitment via Internet. Since the 
delegation within the OSCE and the SCO organisational culture differs, the SCO has proved to 
be less autonomous than the OSCE. Therefore, the OSCE should engage in more frequent 
negotiations at the level of individual SCO mS to identify their cooperative vision with the 
OSCE.  
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Given the timeframe and scope, the limit of this study lies in not engaging a more 
detailed analysis of “perceptions of illegitimacy” and the “resistance of major mS” as obstacles 
to cooperation between the OSCE and the SCO. Nevertheless, this study can serve as a basis 
for further research in this regard since “perceptions of illegitimacy” have links to diverging 
values embedded in the organisational cultures. Moreover, the “resistance of major mS” again 
reflects the division between the mS with Western liberal democracy values such as the EU and 
the US on one hand, and mS guided by “Asian values” such as Russia, Central Asia, China on 
the other. Further research can thus identify causal mechanisms between organisational culture, 
“illegitimacy perceptions” and “resistance of mS” and their impact on IOC.  
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